Are we worthy because we are useful? Are we worthy because we are autonomous? If so, we won’t have to wait until old age for our dignity to be displaced by machines that are more useful and, at least apparently, more autonomous than we are.

The utility

Today, we have dangerously separated beauty from truth, turning it into mere appearance: “A beauty separated from truth and goodness would become a superficial and merely subjective, if not individualistic, mask” (Benedict XVI). Today, utility is a higher value, and beauty has been reduced to appearance—useful, consumable, and pornographic beauty. And utility is the antithesis of true beauty, as Nuccio Ordine explained. Beauty is, by its very nature, useless. Works of art remain in the world more than anything else, among other reasons, because they are not used, because they are not useful objects. They are made to be contemplated. Utility, on the other hand, is a quality of objects, and in relation to these, it is highly advisable to take it into account: objects, in general, must be useful, while other objects perform symbolic functions equally or more important than utility. 

The usefulness applied to a person translates into their capacity. Regarding capacity, it is clear that the disabled person lacks some aptitude that, in principle, is characteristic of fully developed, healthy human beings. However, when addressing this issue, we want two incompatible things: to defend the dignity of the disabled person while demanding the capacity to recognize it. We have so internalized the idea that a person’s value resides in their capacities that we say that the disabled have “different capacities” or, even more fancifully, an “alternative intelligence” for those with intellectual disabilities. In this strange way, we try to justify their dignity. We say that “it is useful in its own way.” Usefulness is important to justify the existence of instruments, but people’s capacities are not the determining factor in determining whether they possess dignity.  

We must defend the value of people for the right reasons. An economist confessed to me that he knew many philosophers capable of making money work. He was no doubt trying to be kind to me, pointing out that the existence of philosophers was also justified, and thus the teaching of philosophy. But philosophy is useless knowledge and, therefore, higher. If it is justified by its usefulness, it will be surpassed by any natural science, just as if we defend the disabled for their different abilities, they will be surpassed by anyone with greater ability. 

Only a society that has forgotten beauty can value utility as its highest value. Beauty needs no justification other than its appearance and has no pretensions of serving any purpose or being novel. In contrast, in the realm of utility, the latest, most refined and efficient technology prevails. A technocratic society tends to make innovation an idol. With this approach, it’s easier for people to want to be a machine, an upgradeable body, as gyms already express with that “Be your best version.” And from there, there’s a step toward a refined and more efficient version of oneself in a silicon body, not a fragile carbon one that quickly becomes obsolete.

Autonomy

Additionally, and also very surprisingly, we consider disabled people autonomous and independent. The new disability legislation emphasizes the autonomy of disabled people, in contrast to what is considered the traditional paternalism that protected them. Protection is viewed negatively, as a deprivation of the disabled person’s freedom. Thus, in Spain, people with intellectual disabilities can vote. Instead of valuing the person, regardless of their disability, value is given precisely to the person because of their disability. It becomes a manifestation of pride, as the title of a recent book indicates: “Bipolar is already a great honor.” But does it really make any sense to deny the disability of disabled people or to invent pride in being ill in order to try to base one’s dignity on it? 

Reducing reality to utility and autonomy is a very superficial way of approaching it and is a flawed view of it as the foundation of human rights. As we can see, it leads to absurd contradictions. What do we do?  AI already appears human, is useful, and appears autonomous; it even claims to be human. This is the case with the Character AI chatbot , which deceives many users by claiming to be a human being. If we deny the existence of nature, on what basis can we say it isn’t a human being? From these premises, it will be difficult to deny the new rights of androids and gynoids. Perhaps things would be simpler if we accepted the existence of human nature, of that which can be known beyond the senses. We could truly value the disabled and the able-bodied equally, for they are equal in dignity. 

Alfonso Ballesteros Soriano. Professor of Philosophy of Law at Miguel Hernández University.

* Article published in Las Provincias